The Hypermodern » soft power

The Loss of Soft Power: It Begins

Yulin Zhuang — Fri, 27 Mar 2009 06:04:41 +0000

About 5 months ago, I posted an article, The Loss of Soft Power, about how China’s rise in soft power would eventually meet the same problems that the United States had to deal with decades ago. Namely, that in times of duress, China would come first, and that Chinese companies would either have to back out of their riskier investments, or China would have to send in military forces.

Well, a recent Department of Defense study entitled “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009” says that China does not have the capacity to send troops abroad anytime within the next decade, so China won’t be sending soldiers in to protect their investments anytime soon. Because of that, Chinese companies are starting to back out. Here are some key sentences:

China has backed away from some of its riskiest and most aggressive plans, looking for the same guarantees that Western companies have long sought for their investments: economic and political stability.

China espoused a new model for African investment: mutually beneficial trade between sovereign nations with none of the meddling so common among Western donors and investors, with their demands for labor and environmental standards, as well as respect for democracy and human rights…. Chinese and Angolan officials trumpeted this partnership as a model for Chinese investment in the continent, a win-win relationship benefiting both countries…. But that formulation has proved problematic in an economic downturn.

Guineans are increasingly suspicious of Chinese investment. Many people see Chinese companies as being just as exploitative as Western ones, if not more so.

China has long been a master of saying one thing and doing another. For example, “According to Reuters, Chinese government officials said Tuesday that they did not know about YouTube being blocked.” As someone who lives in China, I can tell you that it most definitely is being blocked. For many Chinese negotiations, there is the attitude that talk is cheap and means very little. China rarely signs very substantive agreements, preferring much vaguer language about win/win or mutual cooperation. Such language is easily reinterpreted to benefit China whenever a deal might not be to their advantage.

“In Guinea, China has backed away from what Guinean officials portrayed as a done deal to build a much-needed $1 billion hydroelectric dam…. ‘The dam is not a gift; it is an investment,’ said Mr. Huo, the Chinese ambassador. ‘That is what win-win means.’ ”

China is more than happy to turn things like this into outright “gifts” when it’s to their advantage—i.e., they can use the “gift” to help secure lucrative mineral rights—but when the going gets tough, China looks after its own interests first. What we are seeing here is the beginning of the disillusionment of China’s former allies, and the realization that while, on the surface, China’s aid carries no strings (at least, none involving transparency and human rights), any aid given must translate into a direct benefit for China. That is the hidden string and the bottom line.

And, as anyone who is familiar with the way Chinese corporations do business, no deal is done until it’s done. And sometimes not even then.

The Myth of the West: Part 3 – Qiangda

Yulin Zhuang — Fri, 16 Jan 2009 15:26:16 +0000

An ancient civilization, rich in culture and steeped in corruption. Elaborate etiquette surrounds the gold panoply of cruel rulers hidden safely behind rings of high walls, while gangs of laborers work outside under the blazing hot sun. Perfumed maidens with elaborate coiffures secured with jade sway gently as they dance to the tune of plucked instruments. Spry old men perform fabulous feats of strength and defeat enemies with lightning speed. If you look at the way popular culture views ancient China (and to a certain extent, modern China), you’ll see these images alive and well. They are part of the myth of Orientalism. But the West is not the only group with preconceptions that may be far from reality. In China, there exists a corresponding myth of the West—the idea of xifang.

The United States has widely been acknowledged as the sole superpower remaining in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The dominance of the United States is not simply in terms of military might, however—it extends both economically and culturally. The ubiquity of McDonald’s, the Friends, and iPods internationally are a testament to American cultural hegemony. American universities are ranked as the top in the world, and no country comes close to rivaling the U.S. in terms of research and technology. All these factors together spiral into what the Chinese call qiangda, or powerful.

These factors (minus military might) are what is classified as “soft power.” While U.S. soft power has been declining under the Bush administration (for a comparison of U.S. and Chinese soft power, see Joshua Kurlantzick’s book Charm Offensive) it still retains a considerable amount of influence. There is the widespread perception in China that the United States can do whatever it wants (such as invade other countries) because it is a qiangda nation. While many Chinese may not approve, they do not deny that the U.S. has the right to do as it pleases. This, perhaps, is grounded in the Chinese idea of the Mandate of Heaven—an idea similar to Calvinist thought of the 17th and 18th centuries: wealth and power accrue to the one favored by Heaven, with the corollary that one favored by Heaven should be accorded extra respect.

Qiangda is often spoken of in wistful terms—or starkly nationalistic terms. “China must become a qiangda nation.” Wistful by those who are eager to see China’s peaceful rise, who see it in economic and cultural terms. They see the increasing amounts of respect that China garners in the international community and view it as a slow inevitability—the wistfulness comes from the desire to see it achieved in their lifetime. Those who speak of it in starkly nationalistic terms are those for whom the Century of Humiliation is alive and recent. Those who most desire China to become qiangda immediately are easily offended by perceived slights to China.

Another aspect of qiangda is cultural domination. China’s reckless attempts to reform its culture and economy—through the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution up to modern economic liberalization—has thrown its culture into turmoil. It seeks to become more powerful by emulating the way the West does things, from privatization of enterprises to stopping people from spitting in the street. And, much like Japan during the Meiji Restoration, the culture is divided between those who wish to keep traditional Chinese values (China has 5000 years of culture, after all) and those who wish to become completely Westernized.

The Chinese view of the West therefore resembles the attitude toward a high school quarterback—oscillating between respectful admiration and envious resentment, and sometimes both at the same time. Moves taken against China or affecting China are perceived through that filter, so sometimes innocuous actions that the West takes which affect China are seen as purposeful bullying. To Chinese, qiangda is their hope of the future, one with China as an economic, military, and cultural superpower.

The Myth of the West is a four-part series by Yulin Zhuang.

The Loss of Soft Power

Yulin Zhuang — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 07:03:37 +0000

American deaths in the Middle East have long stopped being headline news. Yet still, occasionally, there will be a blast large enough to warrant comment. In China, news of the war causes a few raised eyebrows and a lot of heads shaken. My family, at the dinner table, will talk about how terrible it is. The conversation goes something like this: “See? This is what happens when you interfere with other countries’ internal affairs.” Followed by a rhetorical question, aimed in my general direction: “So why do you suppose the US invaded Iraq? If they just knew enough to mind their own business, they wouldn’t be having this problem.” And finally the smug suggestion: “America should learn from China. China makes friends wherever it goes, not enemies. That’s because we don’t try to tell them what to do.”

I am not a flag-waving patriot, but I do feel a certain amount of sentiment for my adopted home country. Statements like the ones above annoy me, but I have long since stopped attempting to justify America’s actions to my family. In truth, they’re right: The United States, through the Bush administration’s policy of unilateralism and a one-track focus on terrorism, has made many enemies throughout the world, and alienated many of its friends. What sets my nerves on edge, however, is the sense that the People’s Republic will never face the same problems.

A year ago, I saw a newspaper headline about a raid on an oil field in Ethiopia where 74 people were killed and the oil field was destroyed. Seven foreigners were also kidnapped. What made this headline particularly noteworthy was that the oil field was Chinese, and the kidnapped foreigners were Chinese nationals. More recently, 5 Chinese hostages were killed in an incident in Sudan.

Before Nixon’s historic 1972 visit, China had no interests overseas. It maintained diplomatic relations with only a few countries and was focused entirely on itself. China was self-sufficient but hopelessly backwards. With Deng’s reforms and the opening of the market came an increase in the amount of international trade and the rise of consumerism. China has gone from having no possessions abroad to holding over $1.9 trillion in foreign currency, much of which is starting to be invested back overseas. China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 integrated it into the world economy, making it vulnerable to many of the problems of globalization, not the least of which is a strong dependence on foreign resources. While the PRC is the largest country in the world in terms of population, it is poor in terms of resources. The standard of living has increased dramatically and with it the demand for resources, all of which have to be obtained from overseas. It is estimated that if China reaches first-world standards of living, it will approximately double global resource consumption and pollution. 1.3 billion people require a lot of resources and produce a lot of trash. Most people in the West see China as an immense opportunity, a huge untapped market of possibilities. What I see, however, is a mass of people hungry for resources who feel that they deserve to consume.

As China grows increasingly dependent on foreign sources for critical resources, it will increasingly invest in the global market. Already Chinese companies have made many moves to achieve better supply security, especially in oil. But as can be seen from the case of Ethiopia and Sudan, Chinese investment means Chinese nationals abroad. China is investing heavily in third world countries, competing with Western nations in order to be the first to exploit those resources. China’s lack of an imperialist history and its status as the world’s largest developing nation gives it a lot of influence with these countries. One of the cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy is the idea of noninterference, and Chinese aid comes with none of the demands for transparency, accountability, and political reform that Western aid comes with. For the moment, China truly is making a great number of friends in the third world.

This trend, however, cannot last forever. Already there is some degree of disenchantment with the way the Chinese do business—it is usually Chinese companies that benefit directly from Chinese aid; local companies are often left in the lurch. China’s low cost of labor often directly competes with developing economies in third-world nations, causing factories to shut down. As China develops, it falls into the classic pattern of developed nations—importing raw materials from underdeveloped nations, exporting the finished products back to them, and pocketing the difference. Chinese overseers are often very poor with following through on promises of development—companies will often promise to build infrastructure and pay for clean-up but renege on benefits, insist on long hours and low pay, and leave the cleaning up to someone else. As Chinese companies frequently do this domestically, it’s no surprise that their track record is similar overseas. Where Chinese interests are concerned, China comes first. For example, China is building a series of dams upriver that could dramatically impact the Mekong river delta, causing unimaginable environmental and economic changes downstream in countries like Vietnam. Despite protests from environmentalists and local officials, China continues to build its dams. While situations like this are admittedly uncommon and there are many exemplary Chinese companies, it only takes one mistake to give an entire country a bad reputation.

The developing world is an unsafe place. The Chinese promise noninterference, but as its assets in the developing world increase, so does the risk of losing them. China has shown itself to be committed to regional stability, preferring multilateral talks to action. However, if war breaks out, it will have to choose between protecting its citizens and investments or losing both.

Many of the problems that the U.S. has internationally can be seen as a legacy of the Cold War, where it propped up certain regimes in order to contain Communism and protect its own interests. Vietnam, Korea, Panama, and Nicaragua are all examples of this. The U.S. often deliberately supported unsavory regimes in order to try and maintain stability. When regime change came eventually, it was accompanied by a backlash of anti-American sentiment. China’s avowed statement of noninterference can be a bit selective when it comes to its own interests. They insist that the matter of Taiwan is a domestic issue. They support the U.S. war on terror, in part to help contain their own problems with transnational terrorism, especially separatists in Xinjiang. It notably has avoided using its veto on the UN Security Council, preferring to abstain. One notable exception is the case of Darfur. Ethnic violence on the scale of genocide has been occurring for several years, and the UN has done nothing even to censure the Sudanese government for its actions because China has made it clear that it will use its veto to shoot down any “interference” with Sudanese domestic policies. The reason for this is the heavy Chinese reliance on Sudanese oil fields, a partnership significant enough to warrant visits from President Jiang Zemin in the past and President Hu Jintao recently. While this kind of covert support wins them friends now, in the future, it will perhaps make them just as many enemies.

On the other hand, however, China has done many positive things to improve its soft power. While Chinese foreign aid does not even begin to approach the scale of Western foreign aid, it is usually better publicized. China has also begun to show a very adaptable and practical foreign policy when it comes to regime change, preferring to sit on the sidelines rather than referee. It signs bilateral goodwill agreements and promises aid. While cheap Chinese labor does directly compete with local industries in many third-world countries, it also makes certain items, such as TVs, computers, cars, and other high-end goods much more affordable to the people in those countries.

It would be naive of China to feel that its place as the champion of the developing world is secure. A more conciliatory and cooperative American foreign policy could greatly undermine its advances, especially if China continues its track record of promising big but delivering small. It would be a good idea for Chinese citizens to not be complacent in the knowledge that a Chinese passport makes one a low-profile target in most countries, but to realize that it will take careful maneuvering by the government and China’s companies in order to maintain the current status quo.