Kim Jong-il’s unprefaced, unofficial visit to China two weeks ago was the diplomatic equivalent of a drunk dial, with both parties behaving awkwardly, saying things they don’t really mean, and then pretending to forget the incident, or, in the case of North Korea, deliberately misremembering events.

Strangely, the the story of Kim’s visit was only reported ex post facto, perhaps at the behest of the hermit kingdom’s king hermit or perhaps because Beijing feared criticism from their economic ally, South Korea.  After all, who can get flustered about a meeting that’s already happened?  Either way, the visit was a poorly-kept secret, with South Korean media tracking Kim’s every move from Dalian to Tianjin and finally to the Diaoyutai diplomatic compound for dinner with Chinese president Hu Jintao.

Though there has been much conjecture, the exact purpose of the trip remains unclear.  The preferred theory is that Kim wants China’s help in shoring up his country’s battered economy in return for cooperating in nuclear disarmament talks.  But the unannounced and brief nature of Kim’s visit belies this simple explanation.

There is little to be gleaned from the footage and reports of the visit, as information is tightly controlled, but what is clear is the tension between the growing superpower and its erstwhile political ally.  In the video (EDITOR’S NOTE: the video has since been removed from the CNTV website) released about Kim’s visit, we see Hu showing the North Korean leader the fruits of development and Kim looking duly impressed.  Though Kim expressed admiration at China’s development over the last three decades, it remains unclear if he can or even wants to improve condition of his own country.  Many Chinese look at North Korea and see their own country thirty years ago; I wonder if Kim has made the same connection.

North Korea’s continued obstinacy places China in the unenviable role of broker between the West and North Korea, it being the only country that needs the favor of both to protect the status quo.  China relies on the West to power its export-based economy, while North Korea is historically a buffer state to keep Western influence in the form of South Korea and Japan at bay.  (Though a nuclear buffer state is as likely to injure China as it is South Korea.)  Conversely, North Korea finds itself increasingly isolated internationally, with China the only ally it can turn to.

As the economic, political, and social gaps between China and North Korea’s increase, their relationship based on outdated alliances will become more and more strained, and, as with any codependent relationship, there will be a breaking point.  Strangely, the United States finds itself entwined in similar relationships, with Hamid Karzai’s questionable government in Afghanistan and growing tensions with Israel.  Perhaps this is the face of multipolarity in the early twenty-first century.  Any country that has superpower ambitions needs allies.  But as second- and third-world nations become more advanced, autonomous, and agile in diplomacy, we will see more smaller countries taking advantage of their stronger allies, drawing them into a relationship that is less than symbiotic. The question for these stronger nations will be: what do you do when the allies you need stop towing your line?