A few things recently have coalesced in my mind.   Thoughts on democracy, liberalism, and the future of China in both respects.

Religion and History
There’s no doubt that religion is responsible for some terrible things in history and has had destabilizing and polarizing effects on society. The question, however, is whether or not it’s had stabilizing and moralizing effects.

In modern American politics, religion and morality are inseparable.  Religious values are considered a qualification for leadership, as a foundation for moral character.  The word “atheist” conjures up an image of a conniving, Machiavellian figure scheming for power. The Christian focus on charity and good works has undoubtedly been a strong force for good in the Western world.  We owe some of our most venerable and prestigious institutions to ideas that came out of proselytization—universities, abolition, and various charities and NGOs. It’s certainly contributed to the building up of Western society—secular humanism derives many of its core values from religious humanism.

By contrast, Asian societies lack that strong historical background of charity to strangers.  Blood kinship ties were more important than “the fellowship of man.”  Has that been a contributing factor to many of the social ills that plague Asia?  There’s no doubt that in today’s Asian societies, charity and philanthropism are beginning to gain ground, but only slowly at best.  At the same time, however, after decades of repression, religion is making a strong comeback in Chinese society.

(At this point, I feel compelled to make an aside about the attitude of Chinese leaders towards religion.  No matter what you might have heard, Chinese leaders are not opposed to religion.  Their opposition is to organized religion whose members owe allegiance to temporal authorities other than the Chinese government, i.e., the Dalai Lama or the Pope.  If this sounds strange to you, think back to JFK’s campaign, where his Catholicism was a major campaign issue—would he defer to the People or to the Pope?)

How much does religion contribute to having a stable society?  Private charitable initiatives hold certain advantages in ameliorating social ills that are overlooked by the government.  Just try to imagine the United States with government initiatives replacing all private charitable ventures—homeless shelters, inner city mentorship programs, debt counseling, etc.  Leaving aside the question of efficiency, it would be difficult for the government to match the diversity of programs.

Can many of Asia’s problems be traced to this lack of charitable humanitarianism?  John Dower’s Embracing Defeat mentions a problem of postwar reconstruction in Japan—war orphans.  Rendered homeless and family-less by war, roving gangs of children prowled the streets, scavenging what they could.  It was widely acknowledged as a grave social ill—and an enduring source of shame.  While everyone agreed that these children should be taken care of, no one was willing to take that responsibility.  Contrast that with the orphanages set up in Western countries to take care of similar “street rat” problems.  Can the lack of a “Good Samaritan” culture have been the cause of this?

The Importance of Liberalism
Fareed Zakaria looks at this issue from a slightly different perspective.  In his book, The Future of Freedom, he traces the rise of liberalism—respect for individual choice and human rights—in Western society.  He argues that when Constantine shifted power away from Rome, the spatial difference between Rome and Constantinople, combined with the Patriarch of Rome’s spiritual primacy as the inheritor of Paul’s tradition, blended into a religious authority that was independent from the state—unlike the caesaropapism that arose in almost every other society where the church and the state were in close physical proximity.  The struggle between church and state for power gave rise to strong respect for legal authority which delineated their respective powers.  After all, if there is only one supreme authority there is little to restrain one from occasionally overstepping the bounds of power.  When there are two competing authorities, nitpicking over rules becomes a way of expanding one’s influence (and limiting the other’s power).  The rise of Protestantism helped as well—a cohesive minority with a strong vested interest in making sure the government did not meddle with affairs of personal choice.   America was founded on such values.

Amartya Sen wrote in a recent New Republic article about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  One of the revolutionary ideas within it that he singles out is the principle that human rights do not require a legislative basis to exist.  ”This understanding of human rights in pre-legal terms was in accord with the American Declaration of Independence….”  This pre-legal basis has its foundations in the religious traditions of yore.  Sen goes on to single out incidents as the arrest of human rights activists in China upon the publication of a signed letter echoing the demands of the Universal Declaration as evidence of the power of the Declaration.  Clearly the idea of universal human rights has broad appeal, even to an Asian society without the socioreligious framework that it’s based upon.

Human rights and democracy are often equated with each other.  They are perceived as being linked.  However, Zakaria and others make a critical distinction between human rights, liberalism, and democracy.  In his book, Zakaria makes the argument that democracy is a byproduct of liberalism, rather than the other way around.  Democracy has never been a guarantee of a stable, liberal government—Hitler was democratically elected , as were many other dictators in history.  Hitler’s election was not a simple aberration in the glorious history of democracy.  More recently, in the Middle East, extremist groups have risen to power through fair, democratic elections.  Why should this be?

In Embracing Defeat, Dower is struck by the incongruity of the American occupation and its policy of democracy by fiat.  He marvels at how it actually worked—citizens were ordered by the emperor and the occupying power to be democratic, and they promptly did so, creating a model success story.  How does a government order its people to be democratic?  This is a question that has been faced repeatedly by the United States in trying to promote the cause of democracy around the world.  The toppling of corrupt dictators and the implementation of democratic systems has been rife with far more failures than success stories.  Why should that be?

The answer to both questions, according to Zakaria, is in a country’s adherence to the rule of law and individual rights.  He points out, rightly so, that the Asian countries which have the best track record for human rights—Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, et al—were ruled for most of the past half century by authoritarian governments.  Only in the past two decades have they started making painful inroads to true democracy.  He singles out the respect for law, individual rights, and institutions as the pivotal factor in the success of these countries.  Only in a country where there is a respect for the legal rights of individuals can the authority of government be checked to prevent the oppression of a minority by the majority, as in the case of Hitler’s rise to power.  Only in a government where the respect for rule of law and institutions will we see relatively peaceful transitions between opposition parties, unlike the fixed elections, plebiscites, and riots that we see in so much of the Third World.  Countries that lack these traditions—like much of Africa and the Middle East—are having a very difficult time making the transition to liberal democracy.  Perhaps the emphasis of America’s diplomacy is in the wrong place.

What Does This Mean for China?
China is an authoritarian country without a strong tradition of independent institutions.  It is a major source of human rights violations.  Yet there is a growing undercurrent of independent criticisms and viewpoints, inspired by ideas like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The growth of an affluent and educated middle class that is increasingly demanding their rights be respected marks a growing trend towards liberalism.  Yet the major obstacle in China’s route to democracy are some of the very traditions that have led to its economic miracle.

Take as a case study the management of China’s environment.  Environmental Regulation in China (X. Ma and L. Ortolano) talks about the chummy relationship between the local environmental enforcement bureaus and the industries they regulate.  Time after time, they emphasize the cooperative nature of the relationship.  The goal is to get the industry as close to the directives set out by the central government as possible without causing excessive economic hardship to the company.  No-interest loans are given out to companies for environmental upgrades and then forgiven, environmental targets are based on a metric of improvement rather than absolute figures, and fines are assessed based on the company’s ability to pay the fine.  The “rules” set out by the central government are treated like vague guidelines or statements of intent.

This lax approach to regulation has certainly contributed to China’s boom.  It’s allowed state owned enterprises to turn themselves around instead of going bust (and thereby still allowing them to pay retired worker’s pensions) and kept the price of Chinese goods low and competitive, while maintaining increased employment and social order.  This approach to regulation and enforcement is endemic at all levels of Chinese government.  Rules are routinely bent (or outright broken) for the sake of social stability and economic growth.

Yet it is this cavalier approach to regulation and enforcement that poses the single greatest threat to the liberalization of Chinese society and an eventual transition to democracy.  As long as China refuses to strengthen the independence of its judiciary system and the consistency of its regulatory apparatus, then any call for democratic reform is highly premature.